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times, and that the observations
of 2000 years ago deviate very
little from the basic medical con
cepts we hold today. Study of the
Bible reveals an extraordinary con
cordance between data of the
Scriptures and many of the mod-

em and most recent di�
in the biological and medic
To quote Sir Isaac Newto
Scriptures are the most
philosophy. I find more ,
authenticity in the Bible
profane history anywhere
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journal to emphasize the ever-important subject under consideration.

A

Fath« John J. Lynch, S.J .. Professor of Moral Theology at Weston
College. Weston, Mass., has been a frequent contributor to LQ on a
number of topics.

c o nduc t e d a m o n g
some hundred English and
Welsh physicians a few years ago
revealed a marked difference of
opinion regarding the practical
obligations of medical secrecy.1
The questionnaire submitted to
these doctors took the form of a
series of imaginary cases in which
either the common good or the
right s of individuals seemed to
argue in favor of a doctor's di
vulging certain information ac
quired in the course of his pro
fessional practice. The doctors
were asked to express their per
sonal opinions as to proper pro
cedure in each instance. whether
to disclose or to withhold the in
formation in question.
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SURVEY

Some of the problems posed are
quite provocative - and perhaps
the divergence of opinions ex
pressed would be considered even
more so. If a physician, for ex
ample, as a private practitioner,
should discover that a railroad en
gineer, whom he has diagnosed as
epil eptic, intends neither to inform
his employers of his condition nor
to give up his work, should the
doctor himself report the case to
railw ay authorities? Answers were
ed by
"
�
Du

E. C. Dawson, M.R.C.S ..
ties of A Doctor as A Citizen,"
Medical Journal, 4902:' 14748 (Dec. 18) 1954.
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almost seven to one in favor of
divulging the information. Should
the doctor report to the police the
identity of a criminal abortionist,
whose name he has learned from
a woman patient who forbids him
to make use of the knowledge? A
slight majority favored reporting
the culprit, while a strong minor
ity declared for the contrary. A
workman is receiving industrial
insurance compensation for an in
jury alleged to have been received
in the course of his work. Would
his personal physician be justified
in revealing to authorities that the
disability was actually incurred
prior to his employment and that
the claim is therefore fraudulent?
By approximately two to one, the
doctors decided against the pro
priety of revealing this medical
information.
The results of such a poll might
easily provoke doctors to any one
of several adverse reactions either consternation at the number
who would countenance an ap
parent breach of professional eth
ics in certain situations; or impa
tience with the insistence of some
on the absolute sacredness of the
medical secret regardless of all
circumstances; or chagrin at the
failure of doctors to agree on so
basic a question; or perhaps re
sentment towards medical soci-

9

eties whose stringent ethical codes
seem to create the dilemmas which
occasion such uncertainties.
Which, if any, is the proper re
action in the light of sound moral
principles?
In its ultimate refinements, the
moral question of professional
secrecy is complex to the extreme,
and does not lend itself easily to
exhaustive treatment within the
limits of a single article.2 But
there is a certain minimum of ba
sic principles which can be stated
more or less briefly and which
may serve to remove at least the
major doubts which are likely to
occur in this regard. So, in the
interests of practicality, these are
the principal points upon which
solution will depend when prob
lems of medical secrecy present
themselves:
1) The doctor's obligation of
medical secrecy is a serious duty
arising from the natural-law right
of both patient and society;
2) The obligation as derived
from natural law is not entirely
absolute, but admits of some ex
ceptions in accordance with the
rights of both patient and society;
3 ) These exceptions are rela
tively rare, and usually at least
the common good will require that
a doctor maintain silence with re
gard to secret knowledge ac
quired of his patients in the course
of professional practice.

.

� For an excellent and fully detailed
treatment of professional secrecy, in
cluding specific applications to the obli
g_ation of doctors, see Robert E. Regan,
O.S.A., The Moral Pr in ciples Govern
ing P rofessional Secrecy with an ln
quir9 into Some of the More Important
Pmfessional S e c r et s (Washington:
, Catholic University of America, 1941).
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NATURE OF SECREC'1 N
GENERAL

Apart from all technic. :ies. it
is clear that much of \ at we
know - especially knO\V, :ge of
our own deficiencies in tl physi
cal or moral order - is 01 highly
personal and private na ce and
not the sort of informati, . which
we would care to sh � with
others. Fortunately nc all of
appar
those facts are external
ent to others; the eviden< is mer
cifully concealed to evet one but
ourselves. For if other, were to
discover our secret, it co • d cause
us notable displeasure, d :omlort,
embarrassment, or perb ps even
misfortune of a more c lamitous
nature. Hence we take pains to
conceal from others in lfmation
which we consider to be 10 one's
business but our own; a· I we re
sent those who pry int( our pri
vate affairs for the satis 1ction of
their own curiosity. V. ,ether it
be the size of his bank . count or
the nature of his secre' sins. the
contents of his diary or his med
ical case history, the or� i nary in
dividual is extremely j alous of
his monopoly on certa1,1 knowl
edge which he regards as being
exclusively his. In otha words.
one's right to his own secrets is
universally recognized and de
fended as part of our natural her
itage.
It is that commonly accepted
concept which the theologians at
tempt to delineate even more pre
cisely when they define secrets in
general as any hidden knowl edge.

pertaining to a person by strrct
right, which others may not la�
fully seek to possess, use, or dis
pose of (i.e., reveal} contrary to
LY
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the reasonable will of the owner.

They. too, consider a secret to be

the property of its owner in the
very same sense in which material
possessions belong exclusively to
this or that individual. Conse
quently only the owner of a secret
has the right to possess. to use, or
to share it with whom he may.
For others to usurp that exclusive
right is a form of injustice equiva
lent to theft. the seriousness of
which must be estimated in pro
portion to the harm which is fore
seen as consequent upon that in
justice.

Granted therefore the occult

nature of certain information, an

exclusive title to it on the part of
a particular individual, and the
individual's reasonable unwilling
ness to share it with others, there
arises from natural law an obliga
tion on the part of all others to
respect that right just as conscien
tiously as they should respect the
right of private property. If, con
trary to another's reasonable will,
We pry into his secret knowledge
or impart it to others or make un
authorized use of it in any way
!@ . his disadvantage, we do him an
lllJustice just as surely as though
We had appropriated his material
Possessions.

PROFESSIONAL SECRECY

The professional secret is all
this and considerably more, en
.
tailing as it does additional obli91tions even more serious than
tliose already predicated of se
�ts in general. Respect for the
limple" secret ( the term is used
la contradistinction to the more
COmplex professional secret) is re4111ired primarily by commutative
P!aRUARY,
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justice, i.e., by the rights of the

individual whose exclusive posses

sion the information is and to
whose personal detriment viola
tion of that right would tend.
Professional secrecy is demanded
also by legal justice, i.e., by the
common good which is at very
least endangered, if not actually
damaged, by every violation of
professional trust. It is that inev
itable relationship to the common
good of society which marks the
essential feature of the profes
sional secret and reveals its espe
cially sacred character.
This relationship arises from
the fact that certain professions,
altogether indispensable to soci
ety, are of their very nature fidu
ciary. i.e., they necessarily deal
with the secrets of clients. The
medical profession, for example,
which is unquestionably essential
to the good health of any com
munity. depends to a large extent
for its effectiveness on the willing
ness of patients to make available
to their doctors a good deal of in
formation of a secret nature. Be
cause of the necessity of procur
ing proper medical care. patients
have no choice but to entrust their
physicians with knowledge about
themselves which otherwise they
would not dream of divulging.
They do so on the implicit under
standing that their secrets are en
tirely safe with doctors and that
their confidence as patients will in
no way be used to their disad
vantage. They do not relinquish
their right to secrecy, but perforce
allow the doctor to share in the
possession of knowledge over
which they alone retain the right
of any further disclosure.
11
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Now let us suppose an outright
breach of medical secrecy on the
part of a physician. What harm
would thereby be done? There
would be, of course, a personal
injustice to the individual patient,
as would be true in any violation
of secrecy. But over and above
this personal injustice, a blow
would also be struck against the
integrity of the profession as a
whole and consequently against
its future effectiveness for the
common good. To function at
i d e a I maximum efficiency. the
medical profession simply must
command the respect and esteem
of the public and maintain that
tradition of unquestioned trust
worthiness which invites the con
fidences of individual patients.
Conduct which belies that reputa
tion cannot fail to have deleterious
effects on the profession's poten
tial worth as a service to human
ity. It is for this social purpose
that medical codes of ethics are
primarily devised. Their principal
aim is to protect the integrity of
the profession as such, that the
public good may be adequately
served. Professional misconduct,
therefore, becomes reprehensible
not only as an offense against the
individual patient but also as a
form of perfidy against both the
profession and the community.
Such are the several implic�
tions intended by theologians
when they describe medical se
crecy as a special obligation, bind
ing doctors in both commutative
and legal justice, of maintaining a
discreet silence with reference to
the confidential communications
made _ to them in the course of
"12

their practice. The basic
tion of the medical secre.
in no way from the oblig
secrecy in general, and f01
physician to use or to re
patients' secrets contrary
reasonable wishes. The �
the obligation, however,
fold: commutative justic
determines the doctor's d1.
individual patients; and l,
tice, which fixes his resp,
to the medical professio·
the public at large.

bliga
!iffers
·on of
ds the
a l his
, their
rce of
two
which
to his
al jus
sibility
and to

No member of the mec al pro
fession, when he fun. ins as
such, can possibly escap- •his re
sponsibility to the indiv 1al and
simply
to the common good. It
inseparable from his offi, as phy
natural
sician, and made so b
law. It is implicit in the cit con
tract upon which he er rs with
his patient when he und :akes to
act in the latter's bE: lf. and
would be so even inde �nde ntly
of any humanly contrive. code of
ethics. While . it is true · at every
medical code from thf. time of
Hippocrates has recog1 zed and
sanctioned his rule of p•· fessi onal
secrecy, the fundament ,] obliga
tion in no way depends upon hu
man legislation. We do well to
reaffirm and specify it by positive
precept, just as the Church has
often declared other duties of nat•
ural law. But in the last analy sis
we must face the fact that the
medical secret is sacred not by
mere c o n v e n t i o n or arbitrary
agreement among honorable men,
but by virtue of that universal and
immutable law of which none less
than God is the author.
LY
LINACRE QUARTER

A LIMITED OBLIGATION
On the basis of this concept of
medical secrecy, the obligation it
entails is to some extent limited
and not absolute, and may be ex
pressed in such terms as these:
the physician is obliged to protect
his patient's secret as long as the
patient retains the right to secrecy
and remains reasonably unwilling
that its content be divulged, or as
. long as the common good, even
independently of the p a t i e n t 's
right, requires that secrecy be ob
served.
This principle a.ffirms the right
of both patient and society to re
quire secrecy of doctors. And,
with the consistency of logic itself,
it also ·implies that if neither the
patient's right nor the common
good should demand secrecy in a
given ipstance, the obligation i n
that particular case is simply non
existent. Perhaps the easiest way
to explain the exceptions implicit
in the general rule would be to
consider some of the situations in
which revelation of a medical se
cret could be regarded as com
patible with both the patient's
rights and the good of society.
I) Consent of the Patient

a) Explicit Consent
To begin with the most obvious,
it is clear that the patient himself,
as proprietor of his own secret,
may authorize its disclosure to
whomsoever he pleases. Though
still in possession of his right to
secrecy, he may simply prefer not
to exercise it absolutely but to ad
lllit certain others to a share in his
kno wledge. In the event of ex
plicit authorization of this sort, it
is hardly necessary to state that
F!BRUA RY, 1962

no injustice to the patient is done
by revealing the information in
question, provided that only as
much is divulged as has been au
thorized and only to the parties
designated. The patient's request.
for example, that the doctor re
lease to an insurance company
whatever part of his medical rec
ord be necessary for adjustment
of claims, limits both the. recipient
of the information and the amount
to be divulged.
Does the common good make
any demands of the doctor in
cases of this kind? It does, at
least to the extent of requiring
caution lest a wrong impression
be given when· divulging informa
tion even with the consent of the
patient. Especially when dealing
with laymen, a doctor would be
wise to let the fact of authoriza
tion be known to those to whom
he must disclose his patient's se
crets. Otherwise there can be
danger of creating suspicion that
medical confidences are being vio
lated. even when actually they
are not, with resultant discredit
to the individual doctor and to the
profession itself.
( For much the same reason, in
cidentally, doctors should avoid if
possible discussing even the non
secret affairs of their patients, i.e.,
facts about them which may be
common knowledge, but which a
physician might also know in a
professional capacity. Everyone in
the neighborhood may know, for
instance, about the birth of an il
legitimate child. But to have that
knowledge confirmed by the at
tending obstetrician woud not be
the sort of conduct which does
credit to the medical profession.)
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b) P. esumed Consent
It cannot be denied that cir
cumstances can arise in which the
patient's willingness to admit cer
tain others to his secrets may be
legitimately presumed. If for any
reason it is impossible to contact
the patient in circumstances which
seem to demand some disclosure
of professional knowledge, and if
it can be prudently judged that
authorization would be readily
granted if the request could be
made, then presumption of con
sent could be in order. Certainly,
for example, no doctor would hes
itate to call medical consultants
into a case in which an unknown
patient is unconscious and consul
tation advisable. And because it
is only reasonable to suppose that
patients are concerned for their
spiritual welfare, it is also a safe
presumption that they are not un
willing that the chaplain be sup
plied with whatever information
may be necessary to his proper
function in their regard.
Perhaps a practical test for the
validity of such a presumption
would be some such question as
this: is disclosure of this informa
tion so obviously to the patient's
benefit that he would readily au
thorize it if he were able? But
unless that question can be an
swered with prudent assurance in
the affirmative, presumption of
consent in this matter can be risky
business and should be restricted
to that absolute minimum which
only real necessity requires.
2) Cessation of the
Patient's Right

When we speak in terms of the
right to complete secrecy, we im
..,14

ply that one is justified in ,elud
:ire in
ing all others from any
the knowledge he claims 11 secret.
Now it can happen tha others
besides the patient can ac .ire le
gitimate title to the kr vledge
which comprises the me ·al se
cret, and can justly den d that
they be allowed their ightful
Or it
share in that knowledg
gher
can happen that some
moral duty of the patien owards
st par
himself may require at
ret. If
tial revelation of his
either possibility shoulc eventu
entuate
ate ( and how it might
will be illustrated shor ) , it is
one the
clear that no injustice i
in con
patient if a secret, whi
science he should sl e with
others, is actually con unicated
to those legitimate clairr ts. That
is why the doctor's obi, tion was
conditioned previously vith the
proviso, "as long as
P.atient
retains his right to sec, ·,'.
However, even tho ,h there
may be others to who.1 · medical
secret should be divul, ·. it does
not immediately folio: chat the
physician should be
one to
make the disclosure. � �iety and
his profession also h,
further
claims on his silence. ; or unless
we restrict to the ba1 .t possible
minimum even those lisclosures
which do no violence k the rights
of individual patient:;. inevitably
there will result a dan1<1ging loss
of public confidence in .:rnd respect
for the essential inviolability of
professional trust. Primarily for
that reason, the common good will
usually require that the doctor
maintain secrecy evell after the
patient's strict right may ha ve
lapsed. And that is the reason.
LINACRE QUARTERLY

too, for including within our gen
eral principle the phrase, "as long
as the common good, even inde
pendently of the patient's right,
requires that s e c r e c y be ob
served." Translated into medical
terminology. it means that dis
:losure of professional knowledge
should be for the doctor a pro
cedure of last resort.
But to return to cases, what
circumstances could deprive the
patient of his personal right to
complete secrecy? The generic an
swer is "conflict"; more specifically.
conflict either with a higher obli
gation on his own part or with a
predominant right on the part of
others. The following break-down
of possibilities perhaps will serve
to illustrate the type of limitation
which must be put on the patient's
right to_ complete secrecy.
a) Conflicting Obligation
- of the Patient
There are times when a pa

tient's refusal to allow medical se
crets to be divulged to certain
others will do him more harm than

good, and when insistence on se

crecy may appear to conflict with
�ore important rights and obliga

tions of his own. It may happen,
f?r example, that if a needy pa
tien t would only inform a wealthy
relative of his need of some ex
pensive treatment, death might be
averted. Still the patient refuses
to reveal his plight, and the doc
tor may wonder whether for the
atubbor:i one's own good he him
self should contact the relative in
question.
�'As long as the patient retains
L, right to secrecy, the doctor
111S
llust respect that right." And
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from the sole fact that his secret
will do him more physical harm
�han good, it does not necessarily
follow that the right of secrecy
lapses. Only if the harm which
would result is one which he is
obliged to avert even at some sac
rf fice of secrecy. will his right to
tt,at degree of privacy be nullified.
What appears to be, according to
human standards, "the sensible
thing to do" is not always of ob
ligation.
13ut take for example the fallen
away Catholic who is in serious
danger of death from some ail
ment not apparent to the unpro
fessional eye and who has falsi
fied his religion upon admission to
the hospital. He forbids the doc
tor to inform the Catholic chap
lain either of his physical condi
tion or of his religious status.
Clearly this insistence on the right
to secrecy is unfounded, since it
is in direct conflict with the pa
tient's higher right and obligation
to save his soul. Actually he does
not possess the right to that de
gree of screcy, if the revelation
of those two facts represents his
only practical chance for salvation.
Certainly in this extreme case no
right of the patient is violated if
this professional knowledge is
made available to the chaplain;
and, if it is not likely that the lat
ter will acquire the information
elsewhere, the doctor would be
justified in supplying it.
Perhaps the example is so
strained as to appear worthless.
The choice was deliberate because
of a personal conviction that in a
conflict of this kind it is seldom
easy t o decide with certainty that
the right to secrecy must yield.
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Even more seldom would it be the
prerogative of the doctor to solve
such doubts contrary to the pa
tient's own decision. The case cited
above is, I think, clearly one on
which right to secrecy must yield;
but it is one of comparatively few.
b) Conflicting Rights of the
Doctor
Even in the face of his obligation
to respect the medical secret as
being the propi>rty of another. the
physician himself possesses certain
inviolable rights to reputation and
to the pursuit of his material and
spiritual welfare. To what extent
must he sacrifice any of these
rights in order to protect a medical
secret? Or is he justified in pro
tecting his own legitimate interests
even at the cost, if necessary, of
revealing c e r t a i n professional
knowledge?
In at least one such contingency,
it is clear that it is the patient's
right which yields and the doctor's
which prevails. The case is one in
which the medical secret is abused
by being deliberately employed as
a weapon of unjust aggression
against the doctor himself. Instead
of employing his doctor's silence
as a means of protecting his own
legitimate interests ( the only pur
pose for which the right to secrecy
is granted him), the patient now
threatens to make use of that si c
lence in an unjust invasion of the
physician's rights,
Suppose, for example, that a pa
tient were maliciously to bring un
warranted suit for malpractice
against an innocent physician. The
latter's only defense, we can fur
ther· suppose. against fi:iancial loss

1'6

and defamation of charaw: ,s the
testimony of his medical re :ds of
the case. According to t
principle of l e g i t i m a t e self Jense
against unjust a g gres s1 ,. the
plaintiff has sacrificed his ght to
secrecy by making it an in ument
may.
of injustice, and the doc
in proportion to the gravi of the
make
danger which threatens h.
whatever use of p r o f1 ional
knowledge may be truly r essary
to defend himself.
Legally the case is mo simply
solved. Unless I am mis• 1,en, no
plaintiff would be allower J insti
gate such a suit unless h waived
the right to secrecy in wl con sti
tutes pertinent evidence. hus the
solution is again based o . ..:onsent
of the patient. But the m 11 justi
lkatioii of such a legal , mg can
be found in this princir of the
right to defend oneself a· inst unjust attack.
Theoretically it may al happen
that through no fault of , , · patient
the medical secret becou s a sen
ous threat to the doc . , r. The
classic example is that o a doctor
who is himself accused , i a crime
which from professional howledge
he knows was committ,·d by his
patient. The latter, acrording to
the further supposition is in no
way responsible for suspicion hav
ing fallen on the innocent doctor.
and hence cannot be classified as
an unjust aggressor in his regard.
Such a contingency, though pos
sible, does not seem to be a highly
p r a c t i c a l p r o b a b i l i ty. Perhaps.
however, a case in point is created
by the failure of our common Jaw
to recognize in court the privileged
nature of the medical secret. SupLINACRE QUARTERLY

pose, for example, that a civil court
should subpoena a physician to
testify from his records against a
criminal abortionist. Say what we
may about the defectiveness of a
civil law which creates such dilem
mas, th� fact remains that, justly
or unjustly, the doctor could be
prosecuted in many of our states
and severly penalized for refusal
so to testify. Must he in conscience
submit to such a penalty rather
than reveal p rofessional knowl
edge?

On condition that the danger

threatening him can be appraised

as truly serious, and that the doc

tor can avoid it in no other practi

cal way, his testimony from the
medical record would be morally
permissible. ·He should have the
court record show that he considers
his knowledge privileged; and he
should conceal, if possible, the
identity of the patient. Beyond that
point he is not obliged to go. The
reasons in order are these: I ) the
doctor-patient contract cannot be
said to be undertaken with intent
to bind even with serious harm t o
the physician, and hence does not
certainly oblige from justice at that
cost to him; 2) charity does not
require that one protect another at
the serious risk of equivalently the
same harm to self; 3) since in the
circumstances it should be clear to
all that the doctor testifies only
under protest and because of the
alleged req�irements of the com
mon good, neither his own reputa
tion nor that of the profession
sho uld reasonably suffer in public

'8timation.

The solution is not an ideal one,

c:hie8y because the anomaly of our
FEBRUARY,.
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civil law makes ideal sdution im
possible. But perhaps it may pro
vide some measure of assurance
for doctors who must face the di
lemma.

c) Conflicting Rights of Others
We have said that a doctor is
sometimes justified ( at the sacri
fice of secrecy, if necessary), in
protecting himself against a pa
tient's misuse of the secret as a
weapon of unjust aggression. So,
too, he may at times protect other
individuals or society as such in
the same way. What we may le
gitimately do for ourselves in this
regard we may in charity do for
others.
The traditional example cited in
this connection is that of the pa
tient with a contagious and not
readily curable disease who is con
templating marriage and who re
fuses to inform his fiancee of his
physical condition. Clearly the pa
tient is not justified in concealing
the fact from his wife-to-be, and
his silence is a serious threat to
her physical welfare.
May the
physician make the information
available to her?
He should first make all reason
able effort to persuade the patient
either to postpone the marriage
until cured or to inform his fiancee
of his condition. Failing that, he
would be justified in communicat
ing that professional knowledge to
the one interested party, if there is
no likelihood that she would ac
quire the information from some
other source or otherwise be pro
tected from the danger which
threatens her.
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d) Conflicting Rights of Society

lists also consider the qm _ion of
What can be said about the obligation at times to mak such a
conflicting rights of other individ disclosure. I have delibe1 ely re
uals applies a fortiori to the rights stricted this discussion to � ques
of society. This conflict is well tion of right and have a, ded all
illustrated by one of the cases in reference to any obligat, 1. My
cluded in the survey referred to at reason for doing so is n
a con
the beginning of this discussion
these
tention that obligation
that of the epileptic engineer. In cases can never be verilk Rather
refusing either to quit his work or it is a conviction that w
rarely
to inform railway officials of his in medical practice will
doctor
incapacity. this patient is using
encounter a situation in · ich, be
secrecy u n j u s t l y as a weapon yond shadow of all
Jitimate
against the public at large. The doubt, he must under r. 1 of sin
common good demands protection reveal professional kn :l edge.
against his unjust aggression. If And until all reasonabl ,ioubt to
the only practical means of provid the contrary is dispellec! ,o one is
ing that protection is revelation of justiiied in insisting tha. medical
professional knowledge, the doctor secret must be revealed. oral per
is within his moral rights in dis missibility ( "may do")
consist
closing the dangerous fact to the ent with legitimate dif ences of
proper authority. On the very theological opinion; bu: 1oral ob
same principle we would justify ligation ("must do" )
not. In
without hesitation the reporting of this particular matter tl e are too
contagious diseases to the extent many imponderables t make it
necessary to insure proper quaran frequently possible in ractice to
tine.
exclude all legitimate de •t. There
It is when the common good is fore, in what is meant I be a pre
seri_ously imperilled in this way dominantly practical C: · -:ussion, I
that release from the obligation is prefer to transmit the ·uestion of
least difficult, though still far from obligation as it affects iisclosures.
easy. to vindicate. The reason is If doctors ever should ( :1counter a
that if the common good would
case in which they feel conscience
suffer notably more from secrecy bound
and yet relucta,1t to reveal
than it would from disclosure, so a
medical secret, they would do
ciety is considered as preferring
the lesser evil and as thereby waiv well to propose their problem to a
and be
ing the claim which in legal justice competent theologian
it has to the preservation of secre guided by his considered opinion.
The basic reason behind this
cy. In all other cases, however,
that perennial claim of the common caution is again the fact that the
good argues more strongly against common good is ultra-sensitive to
any disclosure of professional any revelation of professional se
knowledge.
crets. Even legitimate disclosures
RIGHT VS. OBLIGATION
have to be regretted to some ex
Besides the problem of the right tent, because together with the
to divulge medical secrets, mora- good which they accomplish the re

is always the danger that the in
tegrity of the profession will suffer
in public estimation. Unless the
good to be achieved is proportion
ate to concomitant harmful effects,
and unless no o t h e r practical
means is available to attain that
necessary good, secrecy should
be maintained. As difficult as it is
to cite practical cases in which a
doctor would be permitted to re
veal a medical secret. it is immeas
urably more difficult to prove in
stances in which he is certainly
obliged to make such a revelation.
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THE SURVEY CASES
On the basis of all that has pre
ceded, my own opinion on the two
other cases proposed to the English
and Welsh doctors would favor

the physician's maintaining secrecy
in both. The most to be achieved
if the doctor reports the abortion
ist is the possible apprehension and
prosecution of ·one criminal. but
unfortunately not the extirpation
of the criminal practice. And if
conviction should depend primari
ly on the doctor's evidence, the
chances of effecting even that re
sult are poor, since he can provide
only hearsay evidence from a hos
tile witness. If the doctor identifies
his patient in order that she be
forced to testify, he is violating her
right to reputation, which is still
txtant despite her moral guilt in
Procuring abortion. It seems to me
that too little good and too much
harm would actually result from
rtvelation in this case, and that the
doctor is still obliged to secrecy.
In the insurance case,s the pa
tient is clearly making an unjust
clai·m under the terms of his policy.
tButhe company has or had at its

1962

disposal, and apparently failed to
use. a very ordinary and acceptable
means of protecting itself against
such an eventuality, viz.. medical
examination by its own physician
prior to issuing the policy. The
patient's personal physician has no
obligation to the insurance com
pany in these circumstances. If by
his silence an injustice is made
possible, it is one which, as far as
the doctor is concerned, he permits
because of a higher necessity and
does not directly intend. And that
injustice which is allowed does not
seem comparable in significance to
the harm which would be inflicted
on the whole profession and on the
common good {£ this type of reve
lation were generally permitted.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Natural law obliges the doctor
to sile nce with regard to the secrets
in which he shares by virtue of his
professional calling. This grave
obligation derives from both com
mutative justice (which determines
the rights of individual patients)
and from legal justice ( which
specifies the right which society
exercises over the silence of doc
tors). Because the rights of pa
tients in this regard are not un
limited, and because the common
good can at times be adequately
served only by some disclosure of
the medical secret. the natural law
obligation of medical secrecy is not
s As proposed to the British physicians,
the case presents the State as the In
suring agent. In order to make the
problem more practical for American
doctors, I am assuming a situation more
common in this country and supposing
a case In which private Industry makes
its own provisions for employee acci
dent Insurance.
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absolute anci does admit of legiti
mate exception. By the very nature
of things, these exceptions should
in the practical order be most rare,
and require most careful consid
eration in each individual case.
It was in reference to an even
more sacred secrecy ( one which
admits of no conceivable excep-

tion) that St. Augustine
to say: "I know less a}
things which I hear in co
than I know of those thin
which I know nothing." I
same rule, then one quit
should characterize the
habitual attitude towards :
cal secret.
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CAPACITY FOR CONCERN*
FRED M. TAYLOR, M.D.
HOUSTON, TEXAS

Your Excellencies, Archbishop
Vehr and Bishop Maloney; Right
Reverend Monsignor McGowan;
Reverend Fathers; Drs. Murphy
and Holoubek; Mr. Chairman; la
dies and gentlemen:
On behalf of the National Fed
eration of Catholic Physicians'
Guilds, as Chairman of the Award
Committee and on the occasion
also as a junior pediatrician, I am
privileged to honor as Catholic
Physician-of-the-Year, 1961, an
elder physician and a senior pe
diatrician, Dr. Norman M. Mac
Neill of Philadelphia.
Before I make the award I
should like, first, to say that Dr.
MacNeill was nominated by the
St. Rene Goupil and St. Francis
of Assisi Guilds of Philadelphia,
and second, to relate to you some
thing about this physician gentle
man. He is a native of one of
Canada's M a r i t i m e Provinces.
Nova Scotia, a part of the conti
nent noted for an unusually high
ratio of advanced educational fa
cilities to population and for an
especially valuable export: brain
power. Dr. MacNeill was born in
Antigonish, which on the province
is eastward and north of the land
of the Acadians of Longfellow's
famous poem, Ev?ngeline.
;--�ddress honoring the Catholic Phy11c1an of the Year, December l. t 96 l.
Annual Winter Meeting, National Federation of Catholic Physicians' Guilds.
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At Antigonish Dr. MacNeill at
tended St. Francis Xavier Univer
sity. Afterwards he e x p o r t e d
himself to the States, and grad
uated in m e d i c i n e from the
Jefferson Medical College in Phil
adelphia. He served the Medical
Corps of the Royal Canadian
Army in World War I. became a
charter member of the British Of
ficers' Club ( often not to the
delight of the Irish in Phildelphia),
and later one of the club's presi
dents.
Dr. MacNeill is a Fellow of the
Academy of Pediatrics. In Phila
delphia he engaged in the practic·e
of pediatrics, and in successive
clinical academic appointments at
tained his present faculty position,
Clinical Professor of Pediatrics
and Attending Pediatrician at the
Jefferson Medical College and
Hospital. Since 1921 in the Clinics
for Children at Jefferson College
and Hospital he has taught child
health to countless students in
medicine and nursing, and to
countless parents as well. He is
a member of the medical staffs of
Germantown, Holy Redeemer and
Nazareth Hospitals. At Jefferson
Hospital a nurses' guild is 'named
not in honor of a Quaker woman
but in honor of a Catholic man
from the province of New Scot
land, thus the MacNeill Nurses'
Guild at Jefferson.
As a pediatrician, his profession
al responsibility has been the care
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